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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Section 
78-2-2, and by and through its inherent equitable and 
constitutional powers. Plaintiff in a District Court may take an 
appeal to this Court from a Final Judgment or Order. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
POINT I. WHEN CONSIDERING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT, WAS IT A MISTAKE, ERROR IN LAW, OR AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION 
FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISREGARD, DISCARD, DISALLOW, AND PUT ASIDE 
ESTABLISHED EXISTING PRINCIPLES OF UTAH CASE LAW WHICH PROVIDES 
THAT CREDIBILITY OR THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE IS NOT CONSIDERED ON A 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
Standard of Review: Where the district court may 
exercise broad discretion, we presume the correctness of 
the Court's decision absent manifest injustice or 
inequity that indicates a clear abuse of discretion. 
Crockett v. Crockett, 193 UAR at 17. 
The trial court "does not have the authority to ignore 
existing principles of law in favor of its view of the equities, 
R.L. Warner v. Sirstins, 195 UAR AT 6. 
POINT II. SHOULD THE APPELLATE COURT AWARD AND ENTER JUDGMENT FOR 
PLAINTIFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $99,000.00, PLUS LEGAL INTEREST THEREON, 
FROM JUNE 9, 1990 TO DATE BECAUSE OF THE BREACH OF CONTRACT BY 
DEFENDANT? 
Standard of Review: "However, a remand is not necessary 
if the evidence in the record is undisputed and the 
appellate court can fairly and properly resolve the case 
on the record before it." Flying Diamond Oil Corp, v. 
Newton Sheep Co., 109 UAR at 13. "Interpretation of an 
'unambiguous, integrated contract is a question of law, 
which is reviewed on appeal for correctness.' (Case 
cited) *** A cardinal rule in construing a contract is to 
give effect to the intentions of the parties and, if 
possible, to glean those intentions 'from an examination 
of the text of the contract itself. ' (Case cited) It is 
a long-standing rule in Utah that persons dealing at 
arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms 
without the intervention of the courts to relieve either 
party from the effects of a bad bargain." (Case cited). 
A. The Appellate Court should reverse the final judgment 
awarded to defendant and remand for determination the plaintiff's 
causes of actions of (1) mental anguish and distress, (2) 
negligence and reckless indifference, (3) conversion and (4) 
constructive fraud. 
Standard of Review: See Crockett supra. We reverse only 
if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to 
the prevailing party we conclude that the evidence is 
insufficient to support the verdict. Crookston v. Fire 
Ins. Exch. 817 P.2d 789. 
POINT III. ARE THE FINDINGS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION, A MISTAKE, OR 
CLEARLY ERRONEOUS WHEN BASED ON SUSPICION, SPECULATION, CONJECTURE, 
GUESSES OR SURMISE? 
Standard of Review: In construing Rule 52(a), we do not 
set aside the Trial Court's factual findings unless they 
are against the clear weight of the evidence or we 
otherwise reach a definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been made. Western Kane County etc. v. 
Jackson Cattle Co., 744 P.2d 1376. 
Factual findings are clearly erroneous if they are without 
adequate evidentiary support or induced by an erroneous view of the 
law. Western Cap.S Sec, v. Knudsvicr 768 P2d. 989 cert.den.; R.L. 
Warner v.Sirstins, 195 UAR at 5, supra. 
A. The Conclusions and Judgment cannot be correct when the 
Findings are based on suspicion, speculation, conjecture, guesses 
or surmise. 
Standard of Review: On review, we accord conclusions of 
law no particular deference, but review them for 
correctness *** we are free to reappraise the Trial 
Court's legal conclusions. Western Fiberglass v. Kirton, 
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McConkie and Bushnell, 129 UAR at 29. Copper State T&L 
v. Bruno, 735 P.2d at 389. We accord no deference to the 
Trial Court's Conclusions that the facts are not in 
dispute. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 188 UAR at 32. 
B. The Trial Court erred and abused its discretion in denying 
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's grant or denial of 
a motion for a new trial will not be overturned on appeal 
absent an abuse of discretion, (cases cited). The 
general rule concerning abuse of discretion is that the 
appellate court "will presume that the discretion of the 
trial court was properly exercised unless the record 
clearly shows to the contrary." (cases cited). Matter of 
Estate of Justheim. (CA 1991) 824 P.2d at 433, 175 UAR 
38. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND PROVISIONS 
The pertinent parts of the following Rules and Statutes are 
provided in Addendum -*-1 . 
U.R.C.P. Rule 56(a) (c)(d) and (e) , also cited at (R.66; 406); 
Utah Code Ann. Section 21-5-4, also cited at (R.945); 
U.C.A. Section 21-5-8, also cited at (R.944). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
a. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff was and is a Canadian citizen, resident, and 
businessman. Defendant sells travelerfs cheques worldwide. (See 
Plf "s Exhibits 10-P and 11-P). Plaintiff and defendant, in Canada, 
entered into a Purchase Agreement, Addendum 6 , (R.18 and 57) . In 
May 1990, plaintiff purchased from defendant $99,000.00 worth of 
U.S. traveler's cheques (R.41-43; 410). (Also see Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 09.) Plaintiff reported to defendant (Plf's Exhibit 5 and 
6) and the Police ( Plf's Exhibit 4) on June 8-9, 1990 that the 
$99,000.00 worth of cheques were lost or stolen (R.51-53; 409). 
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Plaintiff made demand for a refund or replacement of cheques 
pursuant to the Purchase Agreement. Defendant refused (R.54). 
Plaintiff brought this suit against defendant alleging as causes of 
actions (1) a breach of contract, (2) mental anguish and distress, 
(3) negligence and reckless indifference, (4) conversion, and (5) 
constructive fraud (R.2-25). Defendant admitted the Purchase 
Agreement, Addendum _J>, and the purchase by plaintiff of $99,000.00 
worth of the traveler's cheques (R.29-31) (R.656-657), denied the 
cheques were lost or stolen, denied that plaintiff was entitled to 
a judgment. Defendant questioned plaintiff's credibility (R.75). 
Please see Pretrial Order (R.653-662): Plaintiff purchased 
202 American Express Traveler's Cheques (R.656-657). 178 cheques, 
valued at $87,000.00, were cashed. 178 cheques were turned over to 
Toronto Police Forensic for examination R.658 & (R.361). Toronto 
Police Officer Technician Myers examined the 178 cheques and found 
Paul Pauze's thumbprints on 12 cheques (R.658); also see R.361. 
Detective Baxter, a Toronto Police Officer, and defendant's 
Canadian Security Manager Bruce Barr, testified they have no idea 
where the other $12,000.00 worth of traveler's cheques are (R.1548; 
1217). Nicholls testified he lost his cheques (R.400). The 
Canadian Police and defendant have had no evidence at any time that 
plaintiff cashed, negotiated, or countersigned the cheques, 
Addendums _8, _9, and 10 (R.411-412; 1218; 1551). The Police have 
had no evidence at any time of conspiracy (R.1551), Addendum 10. 
b. Course of Proceedings 
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1. Plaintiff filed his First Motion for Summary 
Judgment for breach of contract for $99,000.00, according to Rule 
56 (R.66), with a supporting Affidavit by plaintiff based upon 
personal knowledge (R.39-57) and Memorandum (R.58-63). Defendant 
opposed the Motion claiming plaintiff's questionable credibility, 
see Memorandum R.70, and filed Affidavits by Attorney Mark Webber 
(R.83) and Bruce Barr (R.109) and Police Technician Myers (R.360). 
The Webber and Barr Affidavits are not based upon personal 
knowledge. Plaintiff's Affidavit shows that there is no genuine 
issue of any material fact and plaintiff is entitled to judgment as 
a matter of law (R.39-57). Defendant's Memorandum alleges 
"Nicholls' questionable credibility" as the issue (R.75). The 
Myers1 Affidavit states that 12 thumbprints on the cheques are 
identified as Paul Pauze's (R.360). 
The Trial Court, on March 9, 1992, entered its Ruling, among 
other things, stating, "I have heard the arguments Mr. Anderson has 
made and with regard to the cases that he has brought to the 
Court's attention, the Court cannot weigh the testimony that is 
presented to it in the context of summary judgment. Can't weigh 
the credibility of one witness as against another. *** 
Nevertheless, the defendant or a non-moving party can put 
credibility of a witness at issue, and that is certainly what is at 
the heart of this particular case" *** Addendum 3 , (R.1167-68), 
and entered an Order denying the Motion (R.368). 
2. After further discovery by both parties, plaintiff 
filed a Second Motion for Summary Judgment according to Rule 56 
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(R.390-401), with supporting documents and Memorandum (R.402-408), 
showing that there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that plaintiff was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
Defendant opposed the Motion, filed documents and Memorandum 
alleging whether Nicholls complied with the Purchase Agreement, 
whether Nicholls transferred the cheques to anyone else, whether 
Nicholls conspired in cashing the cheques, and Nicholls1 
credibility as the issues (R.429-432). 
On June 23, 1992, the Trial Court entered its Ruling *** "It 
appears to me that credibility is a major issue in this particular 
case and I think that therefore the cases that say that credibility 
should not be weighed really are not applicable to this particular 
matter. I think there is a genuine issue of fact as to credibility 
in this case for the reasons stated by Mr. Roche." *** Addendum _4 
(R.1165-66); and entered an Order denying the Motion (R.674). The 
case was set for trial. 
c. Disposition at Trial Court 
The case was tried without a jury on July 7-8, 1992 
(R.1192-1369, 1370-1576, 1577-1626). The Court entered its Ruling 
dated July 14, 1992 (R.1577-1626) among other things stating at 
R.1615, "This case, in my judgment, does turn on the credibility of 
Mr. Nicholls, the plaintiff, and the following are the Court's 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law." *** and at R.1622, "I 
believe that there is a very strong suspicion of conspiracy between 
Mr. Nicholls and Mr. Pauze, and perhaps even Mr. Jones, and maybe 
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even his brother, and those are the others I believe the plaintiff 
is entitled to look to in support of their theory." Addendum 5 . 
1. Based on the Ruling, Findings and Conclusions were 
entered (R.1033-37), Addendum 1 . 
2. Finding 3(j) provides "In light of the foregoing and 
all the other evidence adduced at trial, there is a very strong 
suspicion of conspiracy among Nicholls, Pauze, and perhaps even Mr. 
Len Jones and Mr. Brad Nicholls." (R.1036). 
3. Based on the Findings and Conclusions, the Judgment 
was entered (R.1039), Addendum 2 . 
4. Plaintiff filed and served Objections to the 
Findings, Conclusions, and Judgment (R.986; 1048). Plaintiff also 
moved the Court to amend, vacate, and set them aside (R.1048). 
5. Plaintiff filed and served a Motion for New Trial, 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment, and Motion for Judgment for Plaintiff 
(R.1058). Plaintiff moved to deny costs to defendant, and objected 
to the Motion to Tax Costs Against Plaintiff (R.943). The 
Objections were overruled and the Motions denied on the 25th day of 
September 1992 (R.1153). The final Judgment is dated September 21, 
1992 (R.1040), Addendum 2 . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A* Plaintiff, a Canadian citizen and resident, entered into 
the Purchase Agreement, Addendum 6 . with defendant in Canada in 
May 1990 whereby plaintiff purchased $99,000.00 worth of U.S. 
traveler's cheques (R41-43; 410). Plaintiff reported to defendant 
and the Police on June 8-9, 1990 that the cheques were lost or 
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stolen (R 51-53;409). Plaintiff made demand for a refund or 
replacement of cheques for $99,000.00 (R.54). Defendant refused to 
refund or replace the $99,000.00. Defendant's Claims Office is in 
Salt Lake County. Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant in 
the Third District Court, Salt Lake County alleging breach of 
contract, mental anguish and distress, negligence and reckless 
indifference, conversion, and constructive fraud (R.2-25). 
Defendant generally denied the allegations. See Defendant's Answer 
(R.28-38). 
B. Plaintiff filed a First and Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment for breach of contract (R.66 & 390), which Motions were 
denied. See Addendum 3 and 4 Rulings. 
C. The case went to a bench trial. Findings and Conclusions 
were entered, Addendum 1 , with Judgment awarded and entered for 
defendant (R.1040), Addendum 2 . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
1. The First and Second Motions for Summary Judgment should 
have been granted on the grounds and reasons that there was no 
genuine issue of any material fact, as to the breach of contract by 
defendant, and that plaintiff was entitled to summary judgment as 
a matter of law in the amount of $99,000.00 plus interest according 
to U.R.C.P. Rule 56. The defendant's whole case at all times was 
based on disbelief of plaintifffs credibility. The Court in Ruling 
on the Motions at the hearings provided that defendant could allege 
credibility as the issue. The Court, upon hearing the motions, 
considered and ruled that plaintiff's credibility was an issue, 
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Addendums 3 and 4 ; and denied the Motions. The denials wer# 
mistakes, abuses, and clearly erroneous. 
2. The trial court disregarded, discarded, disallowed and 
put aside (Rulings R.1165-66-67-68) Addendums 3 and 4 ) the 
established and existing principles of Utah Case Law which provides 
that it is not the purpose of the Summary Judgment procedure to 
judge the credibility of the averments of parties, or witnesses, or 
the weight of the evidence, Holbrook v. Adams, 542 P.2d 191, and 
this line of cases dating back to about 1958 (R.61; 405-406). 
The purpose and effectiveness of good law and order, in 
complying with established and existing Utah Case Law, is 
substantially impaired or destroyed if the trial court can judge 
credibility or the weight of evidence as the issue at a breach of 
contract Motion for Summary Judgment. 
PRIME EXAMPLE; If a person on probation or a parolee or a 
person with a criminal record signs an unambiguous contract and 
then tries to enforce the contract in court, the other party could 
raise credibility as an issue and try to bash the person and bash 
the contract and defeat the terms and conditions of the contract by 
alleging an issue of credibility on a summary judgment motion. 
3. The trial court "does not have the authority to ignore 
existing principles of law in favor of its view of the equities." 
R.L. Warner v. Sirstins, 195 UAR at 6. Equity follows the law, 
Scoqqins v. State Const., 485 P.2d 391. "The Court cannot consider 
the weight of testimony or the credibility of witnesses in 
considering a motion for summary judgment" (R.406). »*** A 
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judgment may not rest on conjecture and speculation or on mere 
surmise or suspicion nor may a judgment find support in assumptions 
or in possibilities or probabilities falling short of actual 
proof." 49 C.J.S. JUDGMENTS. Section 44. Pl04. "The rule is well 
established that a factfinder cannot disregard uncontroverted and 
unimpeached testimony or the only evidence upon a material question 
in controversy and return a verdict in direct opposition." Briscoe 
v. Ehrlich, 674 P.2d 1064. 
4. Neither does the trial court have authority to convert a 
Motion for Summary Judgment (a law matter - breach of contract) 
into some fact matter - judging an issue to be plaintiff's 
credibility. Winegar v. Froerer Corp., 813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991). 
5. This court is requested to reverse the judgment awarded 
to defendant, and enter judgment for plaintiff on the breach of 
contract for $99,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from June 9, 
1990 until paid; and remand for determination plaintiff's other 
causes of action, mental anguish, negligence and reckless 
indifference, constructive fraud and conversion. (See Plf's 
Exhibits 10-P and 11-P, Defendant's financial ability to pay.) 
Standard of Review: "However, a remand is not 
necessary if the evidence in the record is undisputed and 
the appellate court can fairly and properly resolve the 
case on the record before it." Flying Diamond Oil Corp. 
v. Newton Sheep Co., 109 UAR at 13. "Interpretation of 
an 'unambiguous, integrated contract is a question of 
law, which is reviewed on appeal for correctness.' (Case 
cited) *** A cardinal rule in construing a contract is to 
give effect to the intentions of the parties and, if 
possible, to glean those intentions' from an examination 
of the text of the contract itself. ' (Case cited) It is 
a long-standing rule in Utah that persons dealing at 
arm's length are entitled to contract on their own terms 
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without the intervention of the courts to relieve either 
party from the effects of a bad bargain.111 (Case cited) 
6. The Finding 3(j) states, In light of the foregoing and 
all the other evidence adduced at trial, there is a very strong 
suspicion of conspiracy among Nicholls, Pauze and perhaps even Mr. 
Len Jones and Mr. Brad Nicholls, Addendum 1 , (R.1036). This 
Finding is no basis for the Conclusions and Judgment. "When the 
evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as to do no more 
than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its existence, the 
evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in legal effect, is no 
evidence" (Corpus Christi, R.1070). 
From Corpus Christi v. Heldenfels Bros., 802 S.W.2d at p 39, 
When the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is so weak as 
to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion of its 
existence, the evidence is no more than a scintilla and, in 
legal effect, is no evidence. (Cases cited). We hold that 
the unsubstantiated conclusions and speculations of these 
Heldenfels employees provides no evidence that the City had 
notice of Heldenfels's expectation to be paid by it before 
delivery of the T-beams. 
It is manifest and substantial injustice and a mistake to use 
Finding 3(j) to support the Conclusions and Judgment. The 
Conclusions and Judgment "cannot be based on guesses, or 
conjectures" (Oldenburg, R.1072) and "disbelief does not create 
affirmative evidence to the contrary of that which is discarded." 
Finding 3(j) is not even a scintilla of evidence to support the 
Conclusions and Judgment. The Findings, R.1033, Addendum 1 , are 
not pertinent to plaintiff's claims of mental anguish and distress, 
negligence and reckless indifference, and constructive fraud. 
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From Oldenburg v. Sears Roebuck & Co,, 314 P.2d at 36: 
As pointed out in Reese v. Smith, 70 P.2d at page 935: 
if the existence of an essential fact upon which a party 
relies is left in doubt or uncertainty, the party upon 
whom the burden rests to establish that fact should 
suffer, and not his adversary. (Citation) A judgment 
cannot be based on guesses or conjectures. (Citation) 
Nor may a verdict be upheld "only by resort to 
speculation". Gray v. Carter, 224 P. 2d 28, 30. 
Substantial evidence is required to establish each 
essential affirmative allegation - a scintilla of 
evidence is not sufficient for that purpose. In re 
Estate of Teed, 247 P.2d 54. Of course an inference is 
sufficient to establish a fact in issue but such an 
inference must be founded on "a fact legally proved." In 
analyzing the testimony to determine whether there is 
sufficient evidence to support a particular finding, an 
"appellate court must accept as established all facts and 
all inferences favorable to respondent which find 
substantial support in the evidence." New v. New. 306 
P.2d 987, 994. It is, of course, the province of the 
jury to determine the credibility of the witnesses. 
Naturally, in the exercise of their discretion, they may 
reject testimony as unworthy of credence, but "disbelief 
does not create affirmative evidence to the contrary of 
that which is discarded". Lubin v. Lubin, 302 P.2d 49, 
60; In re Estate of Bould. 289 P.2d 15. The fact that a 
jury may disbelieve the testimony of a witness who 
testifies to the negative of an issue does not of itself 
furnish any evidence in support of the affirmative of 
that issue, and does not warrant a finding in the 
affirmative thereof unless there is other evidence in the 
case to support such affirmative (R.1072). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I, WHEN CONSIDERING THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTIONS FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, WAS IT A MISTAKE, ERROR IN LAW, OR AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DISREGARD, 
DISCARD, DISALLOW, AND PUT ASIDE ESTABLISHED EXISTING 
PRINCIPLES OF UTAH CASE LAW WHICH PROVIDES THAT 
CREDIBILITY OR THE WEIGHT OF EVIDENCE IS NOT CONSIDERED 
ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT? 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF GRANTING THE FIRST MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. Plaintiff's Affidavit is based upon personal knowledge 
(R.40-49): Plaintiff purchased $99,000.00 worth of traveler's 
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cheques as of May 30, 1990 (R.43); Before loss (R.57) he signed the 
traveler's cheques in the upper left hand corner in permanent ink. 
He did not sign the traveler's cheques in the lower left corner 
(R.47), he did not give the traveler's cheques to another person or 
company to hold or to keep or as part of a confidence game (R.48), 
he did not use the traveler's cheques in violation of any law, 
including as part of an illegal bet, game of chance, or other 
prohibitive action (R.48), and that the traveler's cheques were not 
taken by Court order or by government action (R.48). Plaintiff did 
not cash, countersign or negotiate the cheques (R.40-49). After 
loss (R.57) he immediately notified defendant and the police 
(R.45), and reported all facts of the loss of theft and answered 
their questions, and gave them serial numbers and completed 
defendant's refund forms, and defendant took his picture, and he 
did not transfer or deliver the cheques to anyone, and he purchased 
the cheques to use as cash and relied on the safety of the cheques. 
Defendant failed and refused to deliver to plaintiff cash or 
replacement cheques in the amount of $99,000.00 (R.40-49). 
Defendant admits the purchase of the $99,000.00 worth of cheques 
(R.29-33) and admits the Purchase Agreement, Addendum 6 , (R.33). 
See plaintiff's Memorandum (R.58). Summary judgment is proper 
if the pleadings, admissions on file and Affidavit show that there 
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, URCP 56; Gadd v. 
Olson, 685 P.2d 1041, Holbrook v. Webster Inc., 320 P.2d 661 
(R.61). 
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There being no genuine issue of a material fact, plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment should have been granted by the trial 
court against defendant for breach of contract. 
[ This Appellate Court should enter judgment for plaintiff 
against defendant for breach of contract in the amount of 
$99,000.00 plus legal interest from June 9, 1990 to date.] 
EVIDENCE REGARDING THE DENIAL OF THE FIRST MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. Defendant relied on "Nicholls' questionable credibility" 
(R.75). The Affidavit of Attorney Mark S. Webber (R.83), which is 
not based upon personal knowledge, but based mainly upon hearsay 
and conclusions states; that American Express has reason to believe 
that some of the statements made in Nicholls' Affidavit are false 
(R.85). That upon information and belief, Nicholls either signed 
the traveler's cheques himself or used accomplices to purchase and 
to forge the traveler's cheques on his behalf (R.85). That 
American Express has reason to believe that Nicholls has a criminal 
record (R.85). That American Express needs an additional three 
months to complete its investigation, R.86. That Nicholls was 
fined $200.00 in 1988 (R.106). 
The Affidavit of Bruce Barr (R.109), which is not based upon 
personal knowledge, but based mainly upon hearsay and conclusions 
states; that he is the defendant's Security Manager for Ontario 
(R.109). He made some telephone calls (R.110), and that Nicholls 
had reported missing his Visa card (R.lll), and that Barr called 
the Police at the Airport and confirmed that someone by the name of 
Nicholls had flown to Sweden on June 3, 1990 (R.lll), and Barr 
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spoke to Virginia Cartwright on the telephone (who is in 
defendant's Salt Lake City Office) (R.lll), and that Nicholls and 
his Attorney Bob Fenn attended a meeting at defendant's office, and 
that after Barr's initial contact with Nicholls "I am very 
suspicious of this claim" (R.lll). That Barr made "inquiries 
through the security offices of local banks" and heard some 
information and met with some people regarding suspicious claims of 
Nicholls, and Barr formerly laid a complaint of fraud regarding the 
loss of these cheques (R.112). Barr requested the cheques be sent 
to the Attorney General Forensic Laboratory for handwriting 
analysis as well as being fingerprinted (R.113). Barr called the 
Insurance Crime Prevention Bureau and was supplied information 
regarding insurance claims by Nicholls since 1983, and that the 
insurance claims were all paid to Nicholls (R.113). That on an 
occasion Nicholls declined a request to take a polygraph test 
(R.114). 
Defendant submitted the Supplemental Affidavit of Bruce Barr 
dated February 28, 1992 (R.353): Subsequent to lodging a criminal 
complaint against Nicholls with the Metropolitan Toronto Police 
Force, Barr had numerous conversations and meetings with Detective 
Baxter (R.354). That Baxter informed me that fingerprints of Pauze 
had been found on several traveler's cheques. That none of the 
prints on the cheques were those of Nicholls (R.354). That some 
fingerprints on the cheques had been identified as those of Paul 
Pauze, an associate of Nicholls. That Baxter had a photograph of 
Pauze and would be interviewing tellers who had cashed some cheques 
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(R.354). That Baxter had positive identification of Paul Pauze "as 
being the person who cashed the stolen traveler's cheques11 *** 
(R.354). That Detective Baxter charged and arrested Pauze on one 
count of fraud, one count of possession of property obtained by 
crime, and eight counts of uttering a forged document contrary to 
the criminal code of Canada (R.356) . That at the completion of the 
Pauze Preliminary Hearing held in Provincial Court, Ontario, 
February 3, 1992, all charges against Pauze were either dismissed 
or withdrawn by the Crown Attorney (R.356). But see Addendum 7 . 
Barr stated in the Supplemental Affidavit at R.483-484 that 
Baxter informed me that he had positive identification of Paul 
Pauze as being the person "who cashed the stolen traveler's 
cheques1'*** (R.483). 
Defendant submitted portions of Nicholls1 Deposition (R.228-
352) : That his brother Brad did not work in the Office, he worked 
in the shop fixing forklifts (R.247). That Nicholls had not been 
convicted of a felony; that Nicholls purchased $17,000.00 in 
cheques on May 8, 1990 (R.241) to purchase Lift Trucks for his 
business; that he signed the cheques in the top left-hand corner 
(R.251); that the teller was standing there when I signed them 
(R.252); that he took the $17,000.00 of cheques to his office and 
put them in his unlocked desk (R.252) and he did not tell anyone he 
purchased the cheques or put them in his desk (R.253); that he did 
not attend the auction in Chicago. That he purchased $82,000.00 
worth of cheques on May 30, 1990 (R.254-261); that he planned to 
attend a Lift Truck Auction in Sweden on June 4 and 5, 1990. The 
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terms of payments were cash (R.242-263) . That after purchasing the 
$82,000.00 in cheques he placed them in his brief case with the 
$17,000.00 with his birth certificate, credit cards, drivers 
license; he put the brief case in the trunk of his Volkswagen 
(R.270-278). That he was at a car wash (R.281). That he did not 
confirm the cheques were locked in the trunk (R.286-287). He left 
the cheques in his brief case in the trunk of his car at home 
(R.293). The next morning it did not appear his car had been 
broken into (R.295). On May 31, he drove his car to work. He did 
not check the trunk or the brief case or the cheques (R.309). He 
did not learn about the cheques being lost or stolen until June 8, 
1990. He could not identify a possibility as to when or how the 
cheques could have been lost or stolen (R.298). On June 3, he 
packed his suitcase for his trip to Sweden and placed it in the 
trunk of his car. He did not confirm the cheques were in the brief 
case (R. 313-314). He traveled to Sweden on June 3 and went to the 
auction on June 4 and 5; he took the brief case to the auction but 
the bids were too high to purchase any Fork Lifts (R. 317-328) . He 
returned on June 6, 1990, and he kept his brief case with him on 
the airplane, but never opened it. When he arrived home he took 
the brief case into his house. He did not open it. On June 7, he 
went to work but forgot to take his brief case (R.332-337). On 
June 8, 1990, he took the brief case to work, opened the brief 
case, and found the cheques were missing and his birth certificate 
and drivers license were missing (R.333-334). He notified American 
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Express. He had two identical brief cases and both were used in 
his business (R.312-315). 
The Affidavit of Gordon W. Myers filed February 28, 1992 
(R.360-61) states; that he is a Senior Fingerprint Technician for 
the Toronto Police and that he received and examined 178 American 
Express Traveler's Cheques valued at a total of $87,000.00, and 
that he identified Paul Pauze's thumbprints on 12 cheques. 
[ There being no genuine issue of a material fact, the 
plaintiff should have been granted a summary judgment against 
defendant by the trial court for breach of contract.] 
IT IS TO BE NOTED that in the case of Her Majesty the Queen v. 
Paul Pauze, there were 10 charges against Pauze. At the 
Preliminary Inquiry before Judge E. S. Lindsay, February 3, 1992 
(R.2474-2536) the Prosecutor subpoenaed 8 people and called only 2 
as witnesses. The Transcript also shows the conversations between 
the Prosecutor Ms. Lustman, the Court and Defense Attorney Morris 
in which the Court stated, "The accused then is discharged." 
(R.2535), Addendum 7. 
EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT. 
Plaintiff's Second Motion for Summary Judgment (R.390) for 
relief on breach of contract was supported by pages annexed from 
the Deposition of defendant's Security Manager, Albert Bruce Barr. 
He testified that he and American Express have no evidence that Mr. 
Nicholls is involved and his basis is "belief on mv part", and he 
has no evidence that Mr.Nicholls cashed, negotiated or signed the 
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bottom left hand corner of the negotiated traveler's cheques 
(R. 393-398). See Addendum 8. This motion was also based upon 
plaintiff's personal knowledge Affidavit dated September 6, 1990 
with exhibits annexed thereto (R.39-49) (please see Evidence in 
Support of Granting the First Motion for Summary Judgment, supra) 
and plaintiff's Deposition, "I told them I had lost my traveler's 
cheques." (R.400). 
Plaintiff also supported this Second Motion for summary 
judgment with a Memorandum (R.405-406) citing the Supreme Court of 
Utah existing and established line of cases, "Clearly, it is not 
for a court to weigh the evidence or assess credibility *** The 
purpose of summary judgment is not to weigh the evidence." The 
mere assertion that an issue of fact exists without a proper 
evidentiary foundation to support that assertion is insufficient to 
preclude the granting of a summary judgment motion, Webster v. 
Sill, (Utah 1983) 675 P.2d 1170, citing Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural 
Res. Co. , (Utah) 627 P.2d 56; Walker v. Rocky Mt. Recreation Corp., 
508 P.2d 538; Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723; Holbrook v. Adams, 
542 P.2d 191. "The court cannot consider the weight of testimony 
or the credibility of witnesses in considering a motion for summary 
judgment." The court "simply determines that there is no disputed 
issue of material fact and that as a matter of law a party should 
prevail." Singleton v. Alexander. 431 P.2d at 128; Sandberg v. 
Klein, 576 P.2d 1291. "Summary judgment is proper when the record 
indicates 'there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. '" 
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Jones v. Bountiful City. 187 UAR at 23. Summary judgment affirmed 
for Bountiful City. See Rule 56. Summary judgment is never used 
to determine what the facts are, but only to ascertain whether 
there are any material issues of fact in dispute, Hill v. Grand 
Central. Inc.. 25 Utah 2d at 123 (R.405-406). 
Kindly see Addendums 3 and 4 where the trial court abandoned, 
discarded, disregarded and disallowed the above cited established 
existing line of Utah Case Law principles when hearing the Motions 
for Summary Judgment. 
The trial court should have granted summary judgment to 
plaintiff for $99,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from June 9, 
1990 to date because of defendant's breach of contract. 
This Court should award judgment to plaintiff for $99,000.00 
plus legal interest thereon from June 9, 1990 to date because of 
defendant's breach of contract. See Flying Diamond, supra. 
EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE DENIAL OF PLAINTIFF'S SECOND MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Defendant raised the issue of Nicholls' credibility in 
opposing the Summary Judgment (R.432) in its Memorandum (R.422). 
Defendant filed some pages from the Deposition of Nicholls (R.440-
477), to wit: After he purchased $17,000.00 worth of traveler's 
cheques, he placed said cheques in his desk drawer and did not tell 
anyone he purchased them or put them in the desk drawer (R.441-
458) . He purchased $82,000.00 worth of cheques on May 30, 1990 and 
put said cheques in his brief case with the $17,000.00 worth of 
cheques, and put the brief case in the trunk of his car until he 
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left for Sweden, that he did not remove the cheques from his brief 
case or open it from May 30 until June 8, 1990 when he discovered 
the cheques missing (R.465-477). 
Nicholls and Paul Pauze have known each other for ten years in 
a business relationship and social relationship (R.555). Pauze was 
charged with fraud, possession, and uttering forged documents with 
regards to some of the traveler's cheques (R.554). 
Nicholls testified at Pauze's Preliminary Inquiry (R.554). 
He was asked, Q: Have you given anyone permission to have these 
cheques? A: I have no present recollection of that. Q: Have you 
given anyone permission to use the cheques? A: I have no present 
recollection of that (R.555). Q: When you found that the cheques 
were not in your brief case what did you do? A: I went looking for 
my other brief case. I have two brief cases. They were almost 
identical. Q: Did you find this other brief case? A: No, I didn't 
(R.555-556). Nicholls called and told American Express that he had 
lost or misplaced the traveler's cheques and he called the Police 
(R.556). Pause could have touched the cheques in the Office (R573). 
The Prosecutor showed Nicholls some cheques that had some 
chemicals on them that turns your hands funny color (R.557). 
Q: Are you able to identify that cheque (R.557)? A: I t 
appears it is an American Express Traveler's Cheque (R.558). Q: Is 
that your signature on the upper left side of this cheque? A: It 
appears to be (R.558). Q: I don't suppose you remember the serial 
numbers? A: I have no recollection of that (R.558). 
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Nicholls responded that his signature appears to be in the 
upper left hand corner of the cheques (R.558-559). The Prosecutor 
requested him to look through the cheques once again regarding the 
counter-signature on the bottom of the cheques (R.559). Q: Did you 
in fact sign those cheques? A: Where? Q: On the bottom left where 
it says counter-sign in presence of person cashing. A: I have no 
present recollection of doing that (R.560). Q: Did you in fact 
cash any of the traveler's cheques that you bought from American 
Express? A: Which traveler's cheques are we talking about? I have 
bought traveler's cheques on more than one occasion. Q: T h e 
traveler's cheques that we are speaking of, the $99,000.00 that you 
purchased in May 1990, did you cash any of those? A: I have no 
present recollection of cashing those (R.559-560). Q: T h e r e 
appears to be a signature on the bottom of each of these cheques 
*** is that your signature? Did you sign those cheques in that 
place, in the bottom left? A: I have no present recollection of 
doing that (R.562) . Q: Are these cheques part of the cheques that 
you told us that you bought in May of 1990; part of that 
$99,000.00? A: I can't answer that question. I have no records to 
refer to. You are rhyming off serial numbers 13 digits long, I 
have no recollection of them (R.562). The Prosecutor showed him 
several cheques ending with different serial numbers and asked if 
his signature was at the upper left. And, he answered, It appears 
to be (R.563-567). The Prosecutor asked again, Did you sign both 
of these cheques on the bottom left? A: I have no present 
recollection of signing them (R.568). The Prosecutor showed him 
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one more batch of traveler's cheques, serial number GZ030488110, in 
the amount of $500.00 U.S., dated May 31, 1990, with a signature on 
the upper left; Q: Is that your signature? A: It appears to be. 
Q: Is the May 31, 1990 in your hand writing? A: It does not appear 
to be (R.569). 
Pauze's thumbprints were found on 12 traveler's cheques by 
Officer Technician Myers after August 7, 1991 (See Myers' Affidavit 
at R.480). 
The Supplemental Affidavit of Bruce Barr dated February 28, 
1992 shows that he spoke with Detective Baxter and that Nicholls' 
fingerprints were not on the cheques (R.483), and that Pauze's 
fingerprints were found on the cheques (R.483), that Pauze was 
identified "as being the person who cashed the stolen traveler's 
cheques" *** (R.483-484). That Detective Baxter had arrested Pauze 
and charged him with fraud, possession of property, uttering a 
forged document (R.485). That banktellers identified Pauze as the 
person who cashed the traveler's cheques (R.483). 
See Ballarin Deposition at R.489: It shows her as a 
bankteller (R.490) and she cashed some of the cheques (R.491) and 
he countersigned in front of me (R.491). [See her entire 
Deposition at R.1666-1701. Nicholls was present at her Deposition 
(R.1669) and she had seen him in the hall at Court. Q: Was Mr. 
Nicholls the person that cashed the cheques? A: No. (R.1695).] 
See Olivieri Deposition at R.749-764: She was a bankteller 
(R.752), and cashed some of the cheques (R.752-754), and she saw 
the customer counter-sign on the bottom line (R.754) and the 
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customer showed her ID (R.754-758), and she was subpoenaed to 
testify at the Pauze Preliminary (R.760-761), and she saw Nicholls 
at the Courthouse (R.762). Q: Did Mr. Nicholls cash the cheques? 
A: No, he didn't (R.764). [Nicholls was present at her deposition 
(R.1703). Her entire deposition is at R.1703-1737.] 
See Job Deposition at R. 765-779: She worked for some banks 
and now is a part-time employed teller and she picked out a picture 
of a person from the Police pictures that had cashed some 
traveler's cheques with her. [See her entire Deposition at R.1627-
1665. Nicholls was present at her Deposition (R.1630). Q: If the 
person that you saw at your bank had cashed the cheques, if he were 
to walk into this room, would you recognize him? A: Yes. Q: Is he 
in the room now? A: No (R.1649).] 
See Griparic Deposition at R.794-805: She was an experienced 
bankteller, bought and sold foreign currencies and traveler's 
cheques, recognized the signatures on the cheques and recognized 
her handwriting on the cheques and recalled that a gentlemen, 
blonde, about 5'5" cashed the cheques. She looked at Police 
snapshots and pictures and told the Police, this is the gentlemen 
that I remember seeing and I picked out the gentlemen that I felt 
was the one that I had served that day. She was subpoenaed by the 
Police to testify at the Pauze Preliminary. The man that had 
cashed the cheques was in the Courtroom, but his hair was 
different, had the same facial features, same person, but the hair 
did not match what I had seen before. The same person had cashed 
cheques at the airport. I was satisfied with the signature and the 
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ID and I cashed the cheques and the signature was signed in front 
of me. 
(The entire Griparic Deposition is at R.1997-2021). She saw 
Nicholls at Court (R.2017) at the Pauze Preliminary Inquiry. 
Nicholls was at her deposition (R.1999). Q: To your knowledge, was 
he the person who cashed the cheques? A: No, he wasn't (R.2017). 
See Assouline Deposition at R.806-848: She was a bankteller 
(R.809), saw ID and cashed some of the cheques (R.810), he signed 
the bottom signature and she remembers the signature (R.811), and 
she was questioned by the Police and Bruce Barr (R.815) and she saw 
a Police picture book (R.818) and pointed out the person to 
Detective Baxter (R.819), and she went to Court to testify against 
the individual who cashed the cheques (R.819-820), but did not see 
the man in court who had cashed the cheques (R.821). She had a 
subpoena with the name Paul on it and she automatically assumed 
that that was him (R.824). Did Mr. Nicholls cash any cheques with 
you? A. I don't think so, no (R.827). 
Ten (10) people volunteered to defendant for the purpose of 
defendant taking their Depositions in Toronto, Canada, to wit: 
Job, Ballarin, Assouline, Office Myers, Pauze, Brad Nicholls, Debra 
Jones, DeSousa, Griparic and Olivieri. The 6 banktellers, Job, 
Ballarin, Assouline, DeSousa, Griparic and Olivieri, stated that 
Nicholls was not the person who cashed the cheques. 
Defendant's Memorandum shows at R.426 that at the Hearing of 
the First Motion for Summary Judgment, March 9, 1992, before Judge 
Stirba, "For the first time it was disclosed publicly that Mr. 
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Pauze's prints were found on both groups of cheques." (R.426). 
Defendant and the Police had known about the Pauze thumbprints on 
and after August 7, 1991 (R.361). 
POINT II. SHOULD THE APPELLATE COURT AWARD AND ENTER 
JUDGMENT FOR PLAINTIFF IN THE AMOUNT OF $99,000.00 PLUS 
LEGAL INTEREST THEREON FROM JUNE 9, 1990 TO DATE BECAUSE 
OF THE BREACH OF CONTRACT BY DEFENDANT? 
The Appellate Court should award and enter judgment to 
plaintiff for breach of contract in the amount of $99,000.00, plus 
legal interest thereon, from June 9, 1990 to date. A remand is not 
necessary if the evidence in the record is undisputed and the 
Appellate Court can fairly and properly resolve the breach of 
contract before it. See Flying Diamond, supra. 
Kindly see plaintiff's personal knowledge Affidavit (R. 41-57) : 
Plaintiff complied with the terms and conditions of the Purchase 
Agreement, Addendum 6 , (R.57). He received no value from the 
$99,000.00, did not sign the traveler's cheques in the lower left 
corner, did not give the traveler's cheques to any person, did not 
use the traveler's cheques in violation of law, did not transfer or 
deliver the traveler's cheques to anyone, purchased the cheques to 
use as cash, relied on the safety of the traveler's cheques of 
$99,000.00 (R.47-49). 
Defendant relied on plaintiff's credibility as the issue at 
the Summary Judgment Motions. 
Plaintiff's credibility and the weight of evidence cannot be 
considered by the trial court at the Motions for Summary Judgment 
for breach of contract. See Singleton and other existing and 
established Utah Case Law cited above. 
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At the Motions for Summary Judgment, based on breach of 
contract, the trial court had no independent detached authority 
(R.L. Warner, supra) to disregard, discard, disallow, put aside or 
abandon the Utah line of existing and established Case Law cited 
above, i.e. Singleton, Webster. See the Rulings in Addendums 3 and 
4. discarding, putting aside and abandoning the Utah Case Law. 
Defendant had and has no evidence that plaintiff cashed or 
negotiated the cheques, see Manager Barr's Deposition (R.393-398), 
Addendum 8. See Barr's testimony (R.1218) that Nicholls did not 
cash any of the cheques, that Nicholls did not countersign any 
cheques, that Nicholls did not negotiate any cheques, Addendum 9. 
The Canadian Police, including Detective Baxter's testimony, 
had and has no evidence that plaintiff cashed the cheques; or 
conspired with anyone (R.1551), Addendum 10. 
The trial court should not be allowed to enter judgment 
against plaintiff based on opinion where there is no evidence. 
The Appellate Court should reverse the judgment awarded to 
defendant and remand for determination the plaintiff's causes of 
actions, (1) mental anguish and distress, (2) negligence and 
reckless indifference, (3) conversion, and (4) constructive fraud. 
POINT III. ARE THE FINDINGS AN ABUSE OP DISCRETION/ A 
MISTAKE, OR CLEARLY ERRONEOUS WHEN BASED ON SUSPICION, 
SPECULATION, CONJECTURE, GUESSES, OR SURMISE? 
Kindly see Addendum 5 from the Ruling of July 14, 1992 
(R.1613-1625). 
Findings are insufficient, a mistake and clearly erroneous 
when based on suspicion, speculation, conjecture, guesses or 
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surmise. Finding 3(j) provides "There is a very strong suspicion 
of conspiracy between Mr. Nicholls and Mr. Pauze, and perhaps even 
Mr. Len Jones and Mr. Brad Nicholls." Addendum 1 . 
SUSPICION. The act of suspecting, or the state of being 
suspected; imagination, generally of something ill; distrust; 
mistrust; doubt. McCalla v. State, 66 Ga.348. The apprehension of 
something without proof or upon slight evidence. State v. Hall, 
Mo.App., 285 S.W. 1009, 1011. Suspicion implies a belief or 
opinion based upon facts or circumstances which do not amount to 
proof. Burton v. McNeill, 196 S.C.250, 13 S.E.2d 10, 11, 133 
A.L.R. 603. Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition. 
SUSPECT. To have a slight or even vague idea concerning; 
- not necessarily involving knowledge or belief or 
likelihood. Cheek v. Missouri, K. & T. Ry. Co., 131 P. 
617, 624. Black's Law Dictionary, Fourth Edition. 
PERHAPS. Means possibility but uncertainty; By some 
chance, as may be the case. Webster Dictionary. 
MAYBE. Means perhaps. Webster Diet. 
We will regard a finding as clearly erroneous only if the 
finding is without adequate evidentiary support, or induced by an 
erroneous view of the law. Western Cap. & Sec, v. Knudsvict, 768 
P.2d 991. 
Despite the evidence, the findings are so lacking in support 
as to be against the clear weight of the evidence. The trial court 
discarded, disregarded and put aside hard core undisputed evidence 
that the cheques were lost or stolen and that plaintiff received 
nothing for his $99,000.00. The findings must show that the 
court's judgment follows logically from, and is supported by, the 
evidence, Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 426. 
••*** TO be a conspirator one must share a common purpose with 
another, not merely suspect or have knowledge of the others own 
private purpose ***." Harris v. Capitol Records, 413 P.2d at 145. 
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Surmise or suspicion does not create affirmative evidence. Corpus 
Christi, supra. A judgment cannot be based on guesses or 
conjecture or speculation, see Oldenburg, supra and, "disbelief 
does not create affirmative evidence to the contrary of that which 
is discarded.11 
The Conclusions and Judgment cannot be correct when the 
Findings are based on suspicion, speculation, conjecture, guesses 
or surmise. We review the decision for correctness and afford no 
special deference to the trial court's conclusions. Whitehead v. 
Whitehead. 193 UAR at 9. 
The trial court disregarded, discarded, and put aside some 
uncontradicted evidence, i.e., 
Plaintiff's Exhibits 
Ex. 07 - Defendant's corporate credit card issued to Nicholls 
August 1990. 
Ex. 12 - Plaintiff's Statement of Income for 1988, 1989, 
1990, and 1991 
Ex. 13 - The June 5-6, 1990 Sweden sales information, 
including terms of sale cash. 
Ex. 14 - Plaintiff's trip to and return from Sweden, June 3-
6, 1992. 
Ex. 15 - Defendant issued 1 share of common stock to 
plaintiff. 
Ex. 16 - Plaintiff's Canada passport with his picture. 
NOTE: (Please see Defendant's Exhibit 17-d, 
Police Photo Line-Up of 12 pictures.) 
Ex. 17 - Plaintiff's home owners insurance policy, including 
boat and equipment. 
Ex. 18 - Plaintiff's insurance renewal of vehicle, May 1992. 
Ex. 19 - Insurance policy on Nicholls. 
Ex. 20 - Plaintiff's 1989, 1990 and 1991 tax returns. 
Ex. 21 - Letter of credit to Plaintiff $1,420,000.00. 
Ex. 22 - Letter of credit to Plaintiff $100/000.00. 
Ex. 23 - Plaintiff's Certificate of Incorporation. 
Ex. 24 - $92,000.00 loan to plaintiff. 
Ex. 25 - Plaintiff was subpoenaed to testify at the Pauze 
Preliminary Inquiry. 
Ex. 26 - $100,000.00 life insurance policy issued to Nicholls 
July 2, 1992. 
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Ex. 31 - List of credit cards to plaintiff from May 1990 
through June 1992. 
Ex. 34 - Over 7,000,000.00 yen (2 bills of exchange). 
Ex. 35 - Plaintiff's list of credit cards from December 1991 
through January 1994. 
The Court erred in taxing all of the Defendant's Requested 
Deposition and Witness Fee costs against plaintiff. 
1. The Court made no Findings (R.1033, Addendum 1 ) as to 
the reasonableness and necessity of the taxable costs, to support 
the Judgment, against Nicholls in the amount of $4,785.15 (R.1040). 
Defendant requested deposition costs of $2,959.32 (R.936); 
(R.928-942). Plaintiff objected and moved to deny the costs 
(R.943). Defendant was awarded $4,785.15 in the Judgment as 
deposition and witness fees costs, Addendum 2 . 
Ten (10) people volunteered to defendant in Toronto, Canada 
for defendant to take their depositions, see Costs at R.928-942. 
It is unfair, unreasonable and unjust for the trial court to tax 
these deposition costs against plaintiff (R.929). All 10 
depositions show and establish that Nicholls did not countersign, 
cash or negotiate any of the cheques. Six (6) of the volunteers 
were banktellers - who testified that Nicholls was not the person 
who cashed any of the cheques. Officer Myers volunteered to give 
his deposition at the Toronto Police Headquarters and he testified, 
the same as in his Affidavit, that twelve (12) thumbprints of 
Pauze's were found on some of the cheques (R.361). Pauze 
volunteered and testified he handled some of the cheques. Brad 
Nicholls, a brother of plaintiff, volunteered and testified that he 
worked in the shop and knew little, if anything, about plaintiff's 
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business. Debra Jones, a friend of plaintiff, volunteered that she 
did some bookkeeping for the business. 
Toronto Police Detective Baxter volunteered (R.1532-1557A) to 
defendant to attend the trial in Salt Lake City and give his 
opinion at R.1551, Addendum 10 . See Costs of $500.00 for Baxter 
at R.937 and hotel rooms at the Red Lion for $906.15 for Baxter and 
Metropolitan Toronto City Attorney/Solicitor, Jane Eagan (R.939). 
Taxed against plaintiff is the $500.00 and $453.08 with the other 
costs (R.929-942). $953.08 given to Baxter by American Express for 
his visit to Salt Lake City and his offered opinion Addendum 10 , 
at the trial on July 7-8, 1992 is contrary to and conflicts with 
Sections 21-5-4 and 21-5-8. 
The ten (10) depositions that were taken by defendant in 
April-May 1992 in Toronto was after Pauze was discharged at the 
Preliminary Inquiry February 3, 1992 (R.554), Addendum _7_, and 
after Pauze had filed his $2,000,000.00 lawsuit in the Ontario 
Court in March 1992, Pauze v. McCormack, Metropolitan Toronto. 
Detective Peter Baxter, American Express, and Bruce Barr, (R.637-
649). (Also see Def's Exhibit 12-d). The City Attorney, Jane 
Eagan, for Metropolitan Toronto came to Salt Lake City and sat 
through the July 7-8, 1992 2-day trial in Judge Stirba's Court 
(R.1208). 
Nine (9) depositions were taken in the Law Offices of the 
Attorneys for American Express (R.638), Osier, Hoskins & Harcourt, 
67th Floor, First Canadian Place, Toronto Ontario Canada (R.1627-
2024) . 
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The Assouline, Myers, Debra Jones and DeSousa depositions were 
not used at the trial (R.895). 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
Standard of Review: A trial court's grant or denial of 
a motion for a new trial will not be overturned on appeal 
absent an abuse of discretion, (Cases cited). The 
general rule concerning abuse of discretion is that the 
appellate court "will presume that the discretion of the 
trial court was properly exercised unless the record 
clearly shows to the contrary." (Cases cited). Matter 
of Estate of Justheim, (CA 1991) 824 P.2d at 433; 175 UAR 
38. 
The Trial Court's error and abuse of discretion in denying 
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial denigrates substantial justice. 
The Conclusions and Judgment are based on disbelief of plaintiff's 
credibility which disbelief is based on suspicion, suspect, 
perhaps, and maybe. See Addendum 1 Finding 3(j); and 5 . 
Surmise and suspicion is not evidence, Corpus Christi, supra. 
Guesses or conjectures will not support the Conclusions and 
Judgment, Oldenburg, supra. Insufficient evidence does not support 
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment in this case. 
The uncontradicted testimony of Lenoard Jones at trial is that 
on May 30,1990 in the Nicholl's Office, while Nicholl's was in the 
back shop, Paul Pauze flipped through the travellers cheques in 
the brief case on the desk (R1379-81) . 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Appellant requests this Court to (1) reverse the judgment for 
defendant (2) and to award and enter judgment for him in the amount 
of $99,000.00 plus legal interest thereon from June 9, 1990 to date 
because of the breach of contract by defendant and (3) to remand 
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for a hearing, determination and an award, if any, on the 
plaintiff's causes of actions of (a) mental anguish and distress, 
(b) negligence and reckless indifference, (c) conversion, and (d) 
constructive fraud. 
DATED this day of December 1992. 
Wa*&^./2~J?-
WALKER E. ANDERSON 
/Q 
I, Walker E. Anderson, certify that on the * Q day of 
December 1992, I served four copies of the Brief Of The Appellant 
upon Attorneys Keith E. Taylor, Kent 0. Roche, and Mark S. Webber, 
counsel for Appellee, 201 South State Street, Suite 1800, Salt Lake 
City, Utah 84147 and ten (10) copies with the Utah Supreme Court. 
WALKER E. ANDERSON 
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ADDENDUM 1 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
KEITH E. TAYLOR (3201) 
KENT O. ROCHE (2783) 
MARK S. WEBBER (4940) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
201 South State Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
RICHARD DOUGLAS (DOUG) ) 
NICHOLLS, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL ) Civil No. 900904706CN 
RELATED SERVICES COMPANY, ) 
INC., a New York corporation, ) Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
This case was tried to the Court sitting without a jury 
on July 7, 8, and 14, 1992. Plaintiff Richard Douglas (Doug) 
Nicholls ("Nicholls") was represented by Walker E. Anderson and 
by Robert J. Fenn and Colin G. James of Dubernet, Stewart & Fenn. 
Defendant American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. 
("American Express") was represented by Kent O. Roche and Mark S. 
Webber of Parsons Behle & Latimer. 
The Court, having now heard the evidence presented by 
the parties at trial, having judged the credibility of the 
1033 
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witnesses, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby enters 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Nicholls purchased a total of $99,000.00 (U.S.) in 
American Express Travelers Cheques. He purchased $17,000.00 
(U.S.) of Travelers Cheques on May 8, 1990 and purchased the 
remaining $82,000.00 (U.S.) of Travelers Cheques on May 30, 1990. 
2. On June 8, 1990, Nicholls reported to American 
Express that the subject Travelers Cheques had been lost or sto-
len. After American Express refused his demand that it issue 
replacement cheques or refund his money, Nicholls commenced this 
action, asserting claims for breach of contract, mental anguish 
and distress, negligence and reckless indifference, conversion, 
and constructive fraud. 
3. The subject Travelers Cheques were not lost or 
stolen. This finding is based upon all the evidence adduced at 
trial, including, but not limited to, the following: 
(a) This case turns on the credibility of 
Nicholls, and the Court finds that Nicholls' testimony was nei-
ther credible nor plausible; 
(b) In particular, it is not credible or believ-
able that, after purchasing the second batch of Travelers Cheques 
at the American Express office in Toronto, Canada on May 30, 1990 
and placing them into a briefcase already containing the first 
batch of Travelers Cheques purchased on May 8, 1990, Nicholls 
would leave the briefcase unattended in the trunk of his car 
until he arrived at the airport on June 3, 1990, would then 
10M-
hand-carry the briefcase onto an airplane and travel to Sweden 
for the purpose of attending the equipment auction, would then 
attend the auction and actually bid on several pieces of equip-
ment (although never having the high bid on any piece of equip-
ment) , and would then return home without at least once opening 
the briefcase to verify that it still contained his Travelers 
Cheques; 
(c) Nicholls testified that he had a telephone 
conversation with Detective Peter Baxter of the Metropolitan 
Toronto Police Department on October 23, 1991 wherein, according 
to Nicholls, Detective Baxter screamed at him, threatened him, 
and demanded he sign the "will say" statement, when in fact, as 
demonstrated by the tape recording of this conversation (Exhibit 
19-D), Detective Baxter did none of these things; 
(d) A total of $87,000.00 of the subject Travel-
ers Cheques were cashed at 23 different locations in the Toronto 
area during the period of May 31, 1990 through June 7, 1990; 
(e) The fingerprints of Paul Louis Pauze 
("Pauze") were found on 12 of the subject Travelers Cheques; the 
12 cheques containing Pauze's fingerprints included cheques from 
both the first batch purchased on May 8, 1990 and the second 
batch purchased on May 30, 1990; 
(f) Pauze was also identified by four separate 
bank tellers as the person who cashed certain of the subject 
Travelers Cheques; 
(g) Pauze was arrested by the Metropolitan 
Toronto Police Department on July 24, 1991 and charged with 
-3-
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unlawfully defr ai id I i lg N ich< ) 11 s by cashi ng a quantity of the sub-
ject Travelers Cheques and related crimes; Detective Baxter made 
the arrest after Nicholls confirmed to him that, to his knowl-
edge, -ne saw or handled the si ibjuil Travelers Cheques from 
the time Nicholls left the American Express office on the after-
noon of May 10, 1990; whei i. arrested, Pauze informed Detective 
Baxter that In had handled the Travelers Cheques wh i 1 e i n 
Nicholls 1 office; Pauze asserted to Detective Baxter that 
Nicho]. 3 
time thai, ^ second individual, i t 1 ii: I .ei i Jones, was also suppos-
edly present and could verify this point as well; 
(h) Pan/*-* IM", I cpii ii I1"," ijer'sui'ini i frifinl nrl 
business associate : i Nicholls : i . years; 
( > * preliminary hearing I Pauze 7s crimi-
ria] pii : o c e e d :i i i :j, •.) lar } 3 II 95 - : 
testify in a manner consistent with him being > -
ous crime; he refused the prosecutor's request that he review his 
t e s t i m o n y w i t h Ii i pi i i I I In h u m in< | , . u n I <lui IIIIIMI I IIIH h u a i n i g 
he could not even remember whether he actually purchased the sub-
ject Travelers Cheques ~w certain that he did not countersign 
t lie Travelers "C'heqi < 
(j) .., "~ of the foregoing and all the other 
evidence adduced at trial, there IF a v&*\ strong suspicion of 
conspiracy a im »i | 11 i r h i J J I r., I "a u ; : ; e ' ei :t, I Ii : I »€ .i I 3 c nes 
and Mr. Brad Nicholls. 
4. The Court further finds that this action was 
brougi - , s i n • ;• i an attempt to defraud 
1036 
American Express. Nevertheless, the Court does not find that 
Nicholls' action was "without merit" within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 and therefore denies American Express7 
request for attorneys7 fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over this action and 
the parties, and venue is also proper. 
2. American Express did not breach the purchase 
agreements entered into at the time Nicholls purchased the sub-
ject Travelers Cheques, nor did American Express engage in any 
tortious conduct against Nicholls. 
3. American Express is not entitled to recover its 
attorneys7 fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
4. Judgment shall forthwith be entered in this action 
in favor of American Express and against Nicholls. The judgment 
shall dismiss this action and each and every claim asserted by 
Nicholls on the merits and shall furthermore award American 
Express its taxable costs as allowed by law. 
EN^BRES==tfa±sr^^\ day otf"luoustt 1922. 
BY THE COURSE*"'*1*0* -
ANNE M. STIRE 
DISTRICT COURSE 
:^_ t~ z J ^ - ^ iU\-
vm-
-5-
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ADDENDUM 2 
JUDGMENT 
KEITH E. TAYLOR (3201) 
KENT O. ROCHE (2783) 
MARK S. WEBBER (4940) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
201 South State Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
RICHARD DOUGLAS (DOUG) 
NICHOLLS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL 
RELATED SERVICES COMPANY, 
INC., a New York corporation, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * 
This action came on for trial before the Court, Honor-
able Anne M. Stirba, District Court Judge, presiding, and the 
issues having been duly tried, and the Court having entered Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff Rich-
ard Douglas (Doug) Nicholls (,,Nicholls,/) take nothing, that this 
action, including each and every claim asserted by Nicholls, be 
*"^«''vOur„.v.»,< | 
MG 2 3 1992 
$pk,**o o», con 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900904706CN 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
103* 
dismissed with prejudice on the merits, and that defendant Ameri-
can Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. recover from 
Nicholls its taxable costs in the amount oi 
D^EEB-tkis c^lrv^day of August^- 1992. 
• ^ \ S -
BY THE COm'h. 
ANNE^M^^yTRBA 
DISTRicf;^OURT JUDGE 
•2- 104^ 
ADDENDUM 3 
MARCH 9, 1992 RULING BY THE TRIAL COURT 
MONDAY, MARCH 9, 1992 
J U D G E 'S R U L I N G 
THE COURT: All right, thank you, Mr, Anderson. 
As I have indicated, I read before the hearing today the 
memoranda of both parties and the affidavit. 
First of all, with regard to the Motion to 
Strike, there really is no such thing as an oral motion 
under our Rules of Civil Procedure, and I don't really 
consider the Motion to Strike to be properly before this 
Court. It doesn't specifically — and it is not 
pinpointed to specific portions of the affidavit. 
Did you want to say something, Mr. Anderson? 
MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, Rule 7(b) provides 
for motions at this hearing. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Anderson. But 
nevertheless, there was no objection to that and I have 
considered the Motion to Strike. And in view of the 
affidavits that are in the file and to which the Motions 
to Strike are directed, it appears to me that the motion 
is not well taken. At least the supplemental affidavit of 
Bruce Barr and the affidavit of Gordon Myers, as I read 
them, contain statements based on personal knowledge. And 
I simply donft see it the same way Mr. Anderson does as 
to statements that are contained in there. 
Well, first of all, as a summary judgement, 
1 1 C~ 
4 
summary judgment is appropriate where there are no genuine 
issues in dispute as to any material fact. The burden is 
on - - any empha s :i s nvi i s t be drawn in f avor o f the 
non-moving party. 
1 have lii'fiiil I In .n quineii t Mt Andeisnn llhir ninli 
and with regard to the cases that he has brought to the 
Court's attention, the Co"t 11 t cai 11 i• : t \ 7e • 2 gh 11: 1 e test:i ino 1 1 y 
that is presented to it in the context of summary 
judgment, Can't weigh the credibili ty of one wi tness as 
against another. For instance, if the plaintiff says the 
sky is blue and the defendant says the sky is green, the 
Court can't make a determination whether the sky is blue 
or green. Nevertheless, the defendant or a non-moving 
pa 1: ty <::: a 1: 1 p 1 :tt :: 1: ecii 1: • :ii 1 i tj : f a w :i tness at issue, and that 
is certainly what is at the heart of this particular case. 
> 
whether these checks were lost or stolen, and I believe 
t h a t llli*-
 (.it t ulen J l !• I Ii 11 11 r ' t In f-11 ||) 1 t 'bknitut.I i| t ea t 1 a 
genuine factual dispute that prevents the Court from 
granting summary judgment. I think that tl lis :i s ai 1 issue 
,uuv uocd^ to go to trial rather than can be handled on 
summary judgment. 
Now, for that reason, I am going to deny the 
plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment but we are going 
o set >retrial schedule and a trial date at this 
1 1R8 

ADDENDUM 4 
JUNE 23, 1992 RULING BY THE TRIAL COURT 
1 TUESDAY, JUNE 23, 1992 
2 J U D G E 'S R U L I N G 
3 THE COURT: All right, thank you. Mr, Anderson? 
4 MR. ANDERSON: I will submit it, Your Honor. 
5 THE COURT: All right. Thank you, counsel. As 
6 I indicated, I am very familiar with the documents that 
7 have been submitted and the memoranda and also the 
8 exhibits that were attached to these memoranda. It 
9 appears to me that credibility is a major issue in this 
10 particular case and I think that therefore the cases that 
11 say that credibility should not be weighed, really are not 
12 applicable to this particular matter. I think there is a 
13 genuine issue of fact as to credibility in this case for 
14 the reasons stated by Mr. Roche. 
15 With regard to Mr. Anderson's concerns about the 
16 admissibility of some of this testimony, there hasn't been 
17 a Motion to Strike that testimony. I am not pre-judging 
18 it. I think that that is a matter that is reserved for 
19 trial based upon what is presented to the Court at that 
20 time in argument. 
21 I think that there is a particular point to the 
22 testimony of Mr. Nicholls that no one else handled the 
23 checks or knew about them, and then later a different 
24 version comes out that "Well, Mr. Pauze was in his office 
1 1 C ^ 
has been no explanation of this discrepancy offered really 
by Mr. Nicholls, 
As I read the Webster case, a] thoi 1 gh the Coi 11 t 
cautioned district courts to administer this rule with 
10 
11 
12 
13 
15 
17 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
a mis-statement. There is no question of the witness not 
understanding a question, nor is there any equivocal 
answer that we have here. It seems to me that there is a 
blatant inconsistency on that issue alone. So i.i those 
reasons and other reasons stated by Mr. Roche, Mr. 
Anderson, you have been served properly. I am going ^o 
deny your Motion for Summary Judgment. 
This is set for trial on July 7, 1992. We might 
as well conduct soiru retrial matters now to save 
another final pretrial 'his matter. 
( I'.lnl n t . 1 IJ • i i 1 * ' ' M i l l 1J(.| ) 
* 
1 1 en 

ADDENDUM 5 
JULY 14, 1992 RULING FOR JUDGMENT FOR DEFENDANT 
1 defendant also contends that it is entitled to recover 
2 its attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 78-27-
3 56 and the cases cited today as a result of plaintiff's 
4 I allegedly bad faith claims. 
5 J The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over 
6 the parties, the subject matter of this lawsuit and all 
7 I claims, and that venue is also proper. This case, in my 
8 judgment, does turn on the credibility of Mr. Nicholls, 
9 the plaintiff, and the following are the Court's Findings 
10 of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
11 On May 8, 1990, the plaintiff purchased 
12 $17,000, U.S. currency, in American Travelers Cheques, 
13 from the bank of Nova Scotia in Woodbridge, Ontario, 
14 Canada. The cheques are identified as indicated on page 
15 five of the Final Pretrial Order. 
16 On May 30, the plaintiff purchased $82,000, 
17 U.S. currency, in American Express Travelers Cheques from 
18 I the American Express Office in Toronto, Canada. The 
19 I cheques are identified also on page five of the Final 
20 J Pretrial Order. The American Express purchase agreement 
21 I form that it typically uses was in fact used in this case 
22 and a copy of that is attached to the Final Pretrial 
23 Order. 
24 J The plaintiff reported to the defendants on 
25 June 8, 1990 and to the police on June 9, 1990 that the 
38 
TTTTTT 
1 disregarded any — absolutely disregarded evidence of any 
2 I convictions in 1971 or 1973. This is a conviction of 
pleading guilty to possess! i ^f stolen fruo- t-H> * 
I believe that this is only marginally relevant to this 
5 particular case and I have not placed much weight ori that 
par t i cu ] • % v :i c 11 o n. 
this case, the burden of proof is on the 
8 plaintiff T prove by a preponderance of the evidence the 
allegations t:,l la t t:.l: l e ;i;i •] a 1 i iti f f I la s ma :1 =s , I:i: i tl ii s • :::ase 
10 the Court simply does not find the plaintiff's story 
1' credible or plausible. In a business the size of Mr. 
12 Nicholls, :i t :i s i 10 b be] ievable that someone. -• ... - &ave 
13 $99,000 in travelers cheques in a briefcase in a trunk 
11 tfhich could be opened without a key for days on end and 
15 mot even check on them while on a business purchasing 
16 trip overseas- I simply don't find that credible or 
17 believable. 
1 Also, the plaintiff's business associate and 
19 friend for ten years, had fingerprints on several cheques 
20 I and there was evidence that he cashed some f these 
cheques. I believe that there is a very strong suspicion 
22 I of conspiracy between Mr. Nicholls arid Mr. Pauze, and 
23 perhaps even Mr. Jones, and maybe even his brother rind 
24 chose are the others I believe the plaintiff is entitled 
25 to look to in support of their theory. 
^5 
ADDENDUM 6 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
PURCHASE AGREEMENT 
IMPORTANT. Read this Agreement carefully By 
either buying, signing, accepting or using these 
American Express Travellers Cheques, you agree to 
everything written here 
REFUND: American Express Travel Related Services 
Company Inc ( Amexco') will replace or refund the 
amount shown on any lost or stolen Travellers Cheque 
only if you meet all of the requirements below 
BEFORE LOSS: 
• You HAVE SIGNED the Travellers Cheque in the 
upper left corner In permanent ink 
• You HAVE NOT SIGNED the Travellers Cheque in 
the lower left corner 
• You HAVE NOT GIVEN the Travellers Cheque to 
another person or company to hold or to keep, 
or as part of a confidence game 
• You HAVE NOT USED the Travellers Cheque in 
violation of any law including as part of an illegal 
bet game of chance or other prohibited action 
• Your Travellers Cheque HAS NOT BEEN TAKEN 
by court order or by government action 
AFTER LOSS: 
• You IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY Amexco of the loss 
or theft of the Travellers Cheque 
• You REPORT ali facts of the loss or theft to 
Amexco and also to the police if Amexco asks you 
to 
• You INFORM Amexco of the serial number of the 
tost or stolen Travellers Cheque and the place and 
date of its purchase 
• You COMPLETE Amexco's refund forms and 
PROVIDE Amexco with acceptable proof of your 
identity 
• You GIVE Amexco all reasonable Information and 
help requested to make a complete Investigation 
of the loss or theft Amexco reserves the right 
to investigate the loss or theft 
NO STOP PAYMENT: Amexco cannot stop 
payment on any Travellers Cheque 
SIGN YOUR CHEQUES IMMEDIATELY 
IN THE UPPER LEFT CORNER REV * M 
ADDENDUM 7 
PAUZE CRIMINALLY DISCHARGED 
ONTARIO COURT (PROVINCIAL DIVISION) 
HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN 
against 
PAUL PAUZE 
*************** 
P R E L I M I N A R Y I N Q U I R Y 
BEFORE HIS HONOUR, JUDGE E. S. LINDSAY 
AT NORTH YORK, ONTARIO, ON FEBRUARY 3, 1992 
CHARGES: Fraud Over $1,000; 
Possesionn Over $1,000; 
Utter Forged Document x 8 
APPEARANCES t 
Counsel for the Crown Ms. L. Lustman 
Counsel for the accused Mr. L. Morris 
**************** 
2 
PROVINCIAL COURT (CRIMINAL DIVISION) 
T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S 
WITNESSES 
NICHOLLS, Richard Douglas 
GRIPARIC, Maria 
Exam In-
Chief 
10 
36 
Cr-
Exam 
32 
41 
Re-
Exam 
— 
_— 
E X H I B I T S 
EXHIBIT NUMBER 
ONE 
TWO 
THREE 
FOUR 
FIVE 
PUT IN ON PAGE 
19 Six American Express travellers 
cheques, numbered 
GZO30382360-365. 
Ten American Express travellers 22 
cheques, with serial numbers 
RA254101965-969, GZ030488087-089, 
GZ030382382-383. 
Six American Express travellers 24 
cheques, serial numbers 
GZ030488124-129, dated May 31, 
1990. 
American Express travellers 25 
cheques, serial numbers GZ030382376, 
GZ030382331, GZ030382352 and 
GZ030382287. 
Six American Express travellers 
cheques, serial numbers 
GZ030488116-119, GZ030488130-131. 
27 
AG 87 (01/90) 
247 
MS, LUSTMAN: The only matter on our list, 
Your Honour, is the matter of Paul Pauze, 
which is numbers 4 to 13. I understand 
counsel is here somewhere, but I haven't had 
a chance to speak with him, and there is also 
a witness that I would like a chance to speak 
with, and I haven't had that chance. 
THE COURT: Is he here, as far as you know? 
MS. LUSTMAN: As far as I know, but I haven't 
spoken to counsel yet. 
THE COURT: It is a Prelim? How many 
witnesses do you have in all? 
MS. LUSTMAN: Right now, having not spoken to 
couns el, e ight. 
THE COURT: Eight witnesses. Has there been 
full disclosure? 
MS. LUSTMAN: As far as I know, yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Then we will take our 
morning recess. 
R E C E S S 
UPON RESUMING: 
(REPORTER'S NOTE: At this point, other unrelated matters 
were dealt with.) 
MS. LUSTMAN: Paul Pauze. 
MR. MORRIS: If it please, Your Honour, my 
name is Morris, initial L. I appear for Mr. 
Pauze. 
THE COURT: Yes, good morning, Mr. Morris. 
MR. MORRIS: We are ready to proceed, Your 
247 
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UPON RESUMING: 
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MS. LUSTMAN: Your Honour, I have had a 
chance to use the lunch recess to go over 
this case in great detail, and the evidence 
that has already been heard, and at this 
point I am not going to be calling anymore 
evidence, and the Crown is not going to be 
seeking a committal on any of these counts. 
THE COURT: All right. You have no objection 
to that, Counsel, I take it? 
MR. MORRIS: No, I take it that my friend is 
indicating that that will be the end of the 
proceedings? 
MS. LUSTMAN: Well, if it gets discharged, 
that is the end of the proceedings. 
MR. MORRIS: Thank you. 
THE COURT: The accused then is discharged. 
MR. MORRIS,: Thank you, Your Honour. 
CLERK OF THE COURT: The other remaining two 
charges? 
MS. LUSTMAN: Oh, they are withdrawn. 
THE COURT: The other two charges are 
withdrawn. 
MR. MORRIS: Thank you, Your Honour, and I 
thank my friend. 
THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Morris. 
CLERK OF THE COURT: Can I get permission, 
perhaps, to return the exhibits, or do you 
an o7 <m «(v>\ 
On ?5?? 
63 
want them kept as exhibits? 
MS. LUSTMAN: No, the police would like those 
back, actually. 
THE COURT: Yes, so ordered, the exhibits 
will be released. 
MS. LUSTMAN: Yes, thank you very much. 
******************* 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the 
foregoing is a true and accurate 
transcription of my recordings 
to the best of my skill and ability. 
Arlene K. Gorewicz / 
Official Court Reporter 
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ADDENDUM 8 
BARR DEPOSITION 
McHUGH REPORTING - TORONTO, ONTARIO 
A.B. Barr - 3 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
ALBERT BRUCE BARR, 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the plaintiff, 
being first duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows: 
EXAMINATION 
MR. ANDERSON: Let the record reflect 
this deposition will be pursuant to the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Attorney 
Bob Fenn and Attorney Walker Anderson are 
present for the plaintiff and Attorney 
Mark Webber is present with Mr. Bruce 
Barr. 
MR. WEBBER: Let the record also 
reflect that we've made Mr. Barr available 
today voluntarily and without the need for 
a subpoena. 
BY MR. FENN: 
Q. Mr. Barr, I understand you're presently 
employed with American Express Inc.? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. What position do you hold with that 
company? 
A. I'm the Regional Security Manager. 394 
McHUGH REPORTING - TORONTO, ONTARIO 
A.B. Barr - 23 
A. Approximately the same time. 
Q. Same time? 
A, Approximately. 
Q. Or was it at the time you met Mr. Nicholls 
in June of 1990 at your initial meeting? 
A. No. 
Q. You had no suspicions or belief at that 
time? 
MR. WEBBER: That's not what you 
asked him, that's a separate question. 
BY MR. FENN: 
Q. So it was about the same time, spring of 
'91? 
A. That's a ballpark guess on my part. 
Q. Okay. What was the basis for your belief, 
sir, evidentiary basis? 
A. I was informed by the Police Force that 
Mr. Pauze had been identified as negotiating these 
documents. 
Q. Other than that information did you have 
any other evidence upon which you based your belief? 
A. No. 
Q. All right. And would the same apply to 
Mr. Nicholls? 
3?5-
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A. No. 
Q. And on what basis or evidence did you form 
the belief that he was one of the culprits involved in 
this? 
A. I have no evidence. 
Q. You have no evidence? 
A. That's purely submission or belief on my 
part. 
Q. Okay. You had no evidence in 1990 when he 
came to your office in June, I take it, and you have 
no evidence today? 
A. It's still my belief, but' I have no 
evidence. 
Q. All right. You are employed, if I can, 
sir 
A. Can you give me — just back up. Can you 
give me your understanding or belief of evidence? 
Q. Well, okay, before I lose my train of 
thought if I can just deal a minute, sir 
A. I'd like to clarify it before we leave it. 
Q. Evidence? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I'm asking what information or evidence or 
documentation or what basis, you are a Police Officer 
of 25 years? 
3<?6 
McHUGH REPORTING - TORONTO, ONTARIO 
A.B. Barr - 33 
A, You objected. 
MR. WEBBER: I made my objection, you 
go ahead and answer. 
THE WITNESS: Would you repeat the 
question? 
BY MR. FENN: 
Q. As a result of your investigation I'm 
suggesting to you, sir, that your investigation has 
revealed that Mr. Nicholls did not in fact cash those 
cheques personally? 
** MR. WEBBER: Same objection. 
THE WITNESS: I have no evidence to 
support that he personally negotiated the 
items. 
BY MR. FENN: 
Q. Okay. I understand, sir, that in the 
course of your investigation you learned that 
Mr. Nicholls reported the matter to the police? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Which Police Department did it get 
reported to? 
A. I believe it was the York Regional Police 
Force. 0 0 ^ 3 9 * 7 
McHUGH REPORTING - TORONTO, ONTARIO 
A.B. Barr - 117 
Q. Information and belief. 
A. That he signed those cheques on the 
bottom? 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, I don't have. 
Q. Okay, I'll take it one step further. In 
fact American Express doesn't have any evidence 
whatsoever to show that of the negotiated cheques Mr. 
Nicholls did in fact sign the bottom signature; is 
that not correct? 
** MR. WEBBER: I * gi going to make the 
same objection because the witness 
recently has questioned that. 
BY MR. FENN: 
Q. Do you have any evidence, does American 
Express have any evidence at all to show that Mr. 
Nicholls cashed or signed the bottom left-hand corner 
of the negotiated Travelers Cheques? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. I understand, sir, that you 
attended at the arrest of Mr. Pauze? 
A. That is not correct. 
Q. You weren't at the police station? 
A. I was not at the police station. ,v ^AQft 
ADDENDUM 9 
BARR TESTIMONY 
1 friend of his who negotiated the cheques, whose 
2 I fingerprints were found on the cheques. 
3 Q I am asking you the question. 
4 A I am answering the question, sir. 
5 Q At this time do you have any evidence that Mr. 
6 Nicholls cashed any of the checks? 
7 A Cashed any of the cheques? 
8 Q Yes. 
9 A No, sir. 
10 Q At this time, do you have any evidence for 
11 American Express that Mr. Nicholls counter-signed any 
12 travelers cheque in the left-hand corner? 
13 A No, sir, I do note 
14 Q At this time do you have any evidence that Mr. 
15 Nicholls personally negotiated any travelers cheque? 
16 A I believe there is one witness at the 
17 deposition who identified Mr. Nicholls. 
18 Q I am asking you? 
19 A I overheard'the testimony. 
20 Q Do you have any personal knowledge of Mr. 
21 Nicholls personally negotiating any travelers cheque? 
22 A I wasn't present when they were negotiated. 
23 MR. ANDERSON: Your Honor, indulge me just a 
24 moment. (Pause) Thank you, Your Honor. 
25 
25 
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ADDENDUM 10 
BAXTER TESTIMONY 
1 A Of course it disturbed me, 
2 Q Have you brought another case against Mr. 
3 Pauze, a criminal case? 
4 A No, sir. 
5 Q You heard Mr. Nicholls testify at the 
6 preliminary inquiry? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q And you told this Court a few minutes ago that 
9 in your opinion you told someone that either Paul Pauze 
10 cashed the cheques, Doug Nicholls cashed the cheques, or 
11 they conspired among themselves; that is your opinion, 
12 isn't it? 
13 A That is my opinion, yes. 
14 Q Fine. Then tell this Court, if you will, have 
15 you brought any criminal charges for criminal conspiracy 
16 against Paul Pauze and/or Doug Nicholls? 
17 A No, sir. 
18 Q Then I will ask you this question: Have you 
19 got any evidence to support your opinion, other than what 
20 you have testified to here today, as to a criminal 
21 conspiracy? 
22 A No evidence to put before a Court, sir, no. 
23 Q Did Doug Nicholls request documents from you? 
24 A Yes, he did. 
25 J Q Did you give them to him? 
I 181 
ADDENDUM 11 
RULE 5 6 , SEC. 2 1 - 5 - 4 ; 2 1 - 5 - 8 
Rule 56 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
was an abuse of discretion. Griffiths v. Ham- J.P.W Enters., Inc. v. Naef, 604 P.2d 486 
mon, 560 P 2d 1375 (Utah 1977). (Utah 1979), Katz v. Pierce, 732 P.2d 92 (Utah 
Cited in Utah Sand & Gravel Prods. Corp. v. 1986). 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P 2d 703 (1965); 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Reason- Opening default or default judgment claimed 
able Assurance of Actual Notice Required for to have been obtained because of attorney's 
In Personam Default Judgment in Utah: Gra- mistake as to time or place of appearance, 
ham v. Sawaya, 1981 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 937. trial, or filing of necessary papers, 21 A.L.R.3d 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 47 Am. Jur. 2d Judgments ^ 5 5 
\ ! j ! - i s OJ.S. Judgments §§ 187 to 218. , * ? l u ? t o «jve notice of application for de-
A.L.R. - Necessity of taking proof as to lia- [a u l t J u d ^ e n t w ^ e o n 0 t l o c e o l s r e (* u i r e d only 
bihty against defaulting defendant, 8 A L.R 3d b v custom, 28 A.L.R.3d 1383. 
1070. Failure of party or his attorney to appear at 
Appealability of order setting aside, or refus- pretrial conference, 55 A.L.R.3d 303. 
ing to set aside, default judgment, 8 A L.R.3d Default judgments against the United States 
1272. under Rule 55(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Defaulting defendant's right to notice and Procedure, 55 A L.R. Fed. 190. 
hearing as to determination of amount of dam- Key Numbers. — Judgment *» 92 to 134. 
ages, 15 A.L R.3d 586. 
Rule 56, Summary judgment, 
(a) For claimant. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any time after the 
expiration of 20 days from the commencement of the action or after service of 
a motion for summary judgment by the adverse party, move with or without 
supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon all or any 
part thereof. 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or 
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, 
move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his 
favor as to all or any part thereof. 
(c) Motion and proceedings thereon. The motion shall be served at least 
10 days before the time fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior to the 
day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be 
rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is 
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled 
to a judgment as a matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in 
character, may be rendered on the issue of liability alone although there is a 
genuine issue as to the amount of damages. 
(d) Case not fully adjudicated on motion. If on motion under this rule 
judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the relief asked and a 
trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion, by examining the 
pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating counsel, shall if 
practicable ascertain what material facts exist without substantial contro-
versy and what material facts are actually and in good faith controverted. It 
shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts that appear without sub-
stantial controversy, including the extent to which the amount of damages or 
other relief is not in controversy, and directing such further proceedings in the 
168 
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action as are just. Upon the trial of the action the facts so specified shall be 
deemed established, and the trial shall be conducted accordingly. 
(e) Form of affidavits; further testimony; defense required. Support-
ing and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set 
forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirma-
tively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. 
Sworn or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affida-
vit shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affida-
vits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions, answers to interrogatories, 
or further affidavits. When a motion for summary judgment is made and 
supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the 
mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his response, by affidavits or 
as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that 
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judg-
ment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him. 
(f) When affidavits are unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits 
of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons stated present by 
affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be 
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such 
other order as is just. 
(g) Affidavits made in bad faith. Should it appear to the satisfaction of 
the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursuant to this rule 
are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay, the court shall 
forthwith order the party employing them to pay to the other party the 
amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused 
him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or 
attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Cross-References . — Contempt generally, 
Rule 56, F.R.C.P. §§ 78-7-18, 78-32-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Appeal. 
—Adversely affected party. 
Affidavit. —Standard of review. 
—Contents. Attorney's fees. 
—Corporation. Availability of motion. 
—Experts. Cross-motions. 
—Inconsistency with deposition. Damages. 
—Necessity of opposing affidavits. Discovery. 
Resting on pleadings. Disputed facts. 
—Objection. Evidence. 
—Sufficiency. —Facts considered. 
Hearsay and opinion testimony. —Improper evidence. 
—Superseding pleadings. —Proof. 
—Unpleaded defenses. —Weight of testimony. 
—Verified pleading. Improper party plaintiff. 
—Waiver of right to contest. Issue of fact. 
—When unavailable. —Corporate existence. 
Exclusive control of facts. —Deeds. 
—Who may make. —Lease as security. 
Affirmative defense. Judicial attitude. 
Answers to interrogatories. Motion for new trial. 
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21-5-1 FEES 996 
Section 
21-5-14 
21-5-14 5 
21-5 15 
21-5-16 
21-5-17 
21-5-18 
When criminal defense witness may 
be called at expense of state 
Expenses for expert witnesses 
Officials subpoenaed not entitled to 
per diem — Exception 
Only one fee per day allowed 
Interpreters1 fees taxed as costs 
Jury fee assessments — Payment 
21-5-1. Jud ic i a l Counci l ru les governing jury 
and wi tness fee paymen t . 
The Judicial Council shall adopt rules governing 
the method of payment of fees mileage, and other 
expenses of jurors and witnesses, authorization for 
payment, record of payment and the audit of pay-
ment records 1992 
21-5-1.5. S ta te p a y m e n t for j u r o r s and subpoe-
naed p e r s o n s — A p p r o p r i a t i o n s and 
costs — Expenses in jus t ice court. 
(1) The state is responsible for payment of all fees 
and expenses authorized by law for prosecution wit-
nesses, witnesses subpoenaed by indigent defendants, 
and interpreter costs in criminal actions in the courts 
of record and actions in the juvenile court The state 
is responsible for payment of all fees and expenses 
authorized by law for jurors in the courts of record 
For such payments, the Judicial Council shall receive 
an annual appropriation contained in a separate line 
item appropriation 
(2) If expenses exceed the line item appropriation, 
the administrator of the courts shall submit a claim 
against the state to the Board of Examiners and re-
quest the board to recommend and submit a supple-
mental appropriation request to the Legislature for 
the deficit incurred 
(3) In the justice courts, the fees, mileage, and 
other expenses authorized by law for jurors, prosecu-
tion witnesses, witnesses subpoenaed by indigent de-
fendants and interpreter costs shall be paid by the 
municipality if the action is prosecuted by the city 
attorney, and by the county if the action is prosecuted 
b> the county attorney 1992 
21-5-2. Witness and j u r o r s fees in c r imina l cases 
— Daily r e p o r t of a t t e n d a n c e . 
Even witness in a criminal case subpoenaed for 
the state or for a defendant by order of the court at 
the expense of the state, and eveiy juror, whether 
grand or tua l , shall unless temporarily excused, in 
person report daily to the clerk his attendance at 
court from the time of his appearance to the date of 
his discharge, arid no per diem shall be allowed for 
anv dav upon which attendance is not so reported 
1953 
21-5-3. S ta tement of service of wi tness o r juror 
— Certificate. 
Whenever a grand juror, or a witness for the state 
before the grand jury, is finally discharged, the fore-
man of the grand jury shall furnish to the clerk of the 
district court a statement containing information 
necessarv for the clerk to make the juror's or 
witness's certificate 1953 
21-5-4. Fees and mileage. 
(It Every juror and witness legally required or in 
good faith requested to attend a trial court of lecord 
or not of record or a grand jurv is entitled to 
(a» $17 for each day in attendance, and 
(b) if traveling more than 50 miles, $1 for each 
four miles in exces* of 50 miles actually and nec-
essarily traveled in going only regardless of 
county lines 
(c) Persons in the custody of a penal institu-
tion upon conviction of a criminal offense are not 
entitled to a witness fee 
(2) A witness at tending from outside the state in a 
civil case is allowed mileage at the rate of 25 cents 
per mile and is taxed for the distance actually and 
necessarily traveled inside the state in going only 
(3> If the witness is attending from outside the 
state in a criminal case, the state hhall reimburse the 
witness under Section 77-21-3 
(4 A prosecution witness or a witness subpoenaed 
by an indigent defendant attending fiom outside the 
county but within the state may receive reimburse-
ment for necessary lodging and meal expenses under 
rule of the Judicial Council 1992 
21-5-4.5. Food a l l owance for j u r o r s — Seques-
t ra t ion cos ts . 
(1) Jurors may be provided with a reasonable food 
allowance under the rules of the Judicial Council 
(2) When a jury has been placed in sequestration 
by order of the court, the necessar> expenses for food 
and lodging shall be provided undei the rules of the 
Judicial Council 1992 
21-5-5 to 21-5-7.5. Repea led . 1992 
21-5-8. Witness fees in civil c a se s — How paid — 
Taxed as cos ts . 
The fees and compensation of witnesses in all civil 
causes shall be paid by the party who causes the wit-
nesses to attend A witness is not obliged to attend 
court in a civil cause when subpoenaed unless his fees 
for one day's attendance are tendered or paid to him 
on demand, or his fees for attendance for each day are 
tendered or paid to him on demand The fees of wit-
nesses paid in civil causes may be taxed as costs 
against the losing party 1989 
21-5-9, 21-5-10. Repea led . 1992 
21-5-11. J u s t i c e c o u r t j u d g e — Cert if icate of at-
t e n d a n c e — R e c o r d s a n d repor t ing . 
(1) Every justice court judge shall give to each per-
son who has served before him as a juror or as a 
witness in a criminal cause when summoned for the 
prosecution by the county or city attorney or for the 
defense by order of the court, a numbered certificate, 
in which must be stated 
(a) the name of the juror or witness, 
(b) the title of the proceeding, 
(c) the number of days in attendance, 
(d) the number of miles traveled if the witness 
has traveled more than 50 miles in going only, 
and 
(e) the amount due 
(2) The certificate shall be presented to the county 
or city attorney When certified by him as being cor-
rect, it shall be presented to the county or city auditor 
and when allowed by the board of county commis-
sioners or town council, the auditor shall draw his 
warrant for it on the t ieasurer 
(3) Every justice court judge shall keep a record of 
all certificates issued by him The record ^hall show 
all of the facts stated in each certificate On the first 
Monday of each month he shall file with the tieabuiei 
a detailed statement of all ceitificates issued i*w 
21-5-12, 21-5-13. Repea led . 
